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NoTES AND CovmNs
proceedings. However, the process of contempt should never be re-
sorted to as a first means but only when no other remedy would be
effective.
(2) When the defaulting husband proves to the court that he is
financially unable to comply with the decree directing the payment of
alimony, the court may relieve him temporarily or reduce the amount
ordered to be paid with the reserved power to review the revocation
or modification order, and
(3) When any husband against whom a decree to pay alimony
has been rendered, refuses to work if able, or refuses work when found
or offered or who willfully conducts himself so as to be discharged
from work for the purposes of avoiding the provisions of the decree, he
shall upon conviction be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by
imprisonment for not more than six (6) months.
It will be noted that number (1) takes away from the court the
power to imprison a defaulting husband for failure to pay alimony
unless satisfied that the decree can be enforced by no other means or
where the husband refuses to place himself in a position to be able to
comply with the order. Number (2) makes it possible for an insolvent
husband in good faith to temporarily escape the decree of alimony,
subject, however, to liability upon becoming solvent. But, number (3)
grants the court an additional power to prevent the husband from will-
fully remaining insolvent, thus assuring the wife of future alimony
payments. It is believed that these limitations grant the court sub-
stantial remedies for enforcing their decrees and at the same time as-
sure the wife of her alimony payments, saving the cooperative husband
from a jail sentence and reducing the tax money spent for the operation
of county jails.
Jom W. MURPHY, JR.
THE DEGREE OF INTEREST NECESSARY TO DISQUALIFY
A WITNESS UNDER THE DEAD MAN'S ACT
Soon after the enactment of the statute removing the general dis-
qualification of witnesses by interest, almost every jurisdiction in the
United States enacted a statute excluding testimony of a survivor of a
transaction with a decedent when such testimony was offered against
the latter's estate.' These statutes are commonly called "Dead Man's
Acts." Kentucky is among that majority of jurisdictions which have
such statutes in force today. Kentucky's "Dead Man's Act" is in-
corporated in section 606(2) of the Civil Code of Practice which also
'1 WIGmOOE, EvIDNxCE, sec. 578 (1940).
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provides that similar disqualification applies to a witness attempting
to testify for himself as to transactions with infants under fourteen
years and persons of unsound mind. Pertinent portions of the statute
state:
"Subject to the provisions of subsection seven of this section, no
person shall testify for himself concerning any verbal statement of,
or any transaction with, or any act done or omitted to be done ...
by one ...dead when the testimony is offered to be given except
for the purpose, and to the extent, of affecting one who is living and
of sound mind, and heard such statement, or was present when such
transaction took place, or when such act was done or omitted, and
except in actions for personal injury, death, or damage to property
by negligent or tortious act, unless
"(c) The decedent, or a personal representative of, or
someone interested in his estate, shall have testified against such per-
son, with reference thereto,
"(d) An agent of the decedent .... with reference to
such act or transaction, shall have testified against such person with
reference thereto, or be living when such person offered to testify
with reference thereto...."
Subsection 7 provides: "The assignment of a claim by a person who
is incompetent to testify for himself shall not make him competent to
testify for another."2
The purpose of this and similar statutes is clear. They are intended
".. . to prevent an undue advantage on the part of the living over
the dead, who cannot confront the survivor, or give his version of the
affair, or expose the omissions, mistakes, or perhaps the falsehood of
such survivor. The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such
cases is considered too great, to allow the surviving party to testify
in his own behalf."'
It should be noted that the disqualification set out by the statute
is not a general disqualification of the interested witness from testi-
fying in an action pertaining to the decedent's estate, but only from
testifying as to transactions with deceased in such an action. The
court has held that it is without authority to extend this rule further
than specifically authorized by the statutory provision.4
The most litigated question of construction arising from the sta-
tutory provision, and the question to which the remainder of this note
will be limited, is the determination of the degree of interest in the
litigation which the witness must possess to be testifying "for him-
self" and thus incompetent to testify under the terms of the statute.
'For cases interpreting this subsection see: Bagby's Adm'r v. American Surety
Company, 161 Ky. 78, 170 S.W. 492 (1914); Lenora National Bank v. Ragland,
128 Ky. 548, 108 S.W. 854 (1908).
'Owens v. Owens' Adm'r, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878).
'Combs' Adm'r v. Vibbert, 28 Ky. 463, 158 S.W. 2d 957 (1942).
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Several other elements must be satisfied before it is necessary to de-
termine whether the witness is incompetent because he is testifying
"for himself." First, if the action in which the testimony is offered is
one for personal injury, death or damage to property by negligent or
tortious acts, such testimony is always competent. This exception is
expressly defined within the statutory provision. Nor is such testimony
incompetent in an action contesting the validity of a will on the
grounds of undue influence or mental incapacity.5 Although this ex-
ception is not specifically set out in the statute, it is wholly within the
purpose of the statute since such testimony in that action would not be
against the deceased's interest but rather may be used as a safeguard
in determining whether the will contested was the true intention of the
testator. Furthermore, if the decedent, or a personal representative
thereof, or someone interested in his estate has testified against the
witness in regard to the transaction, the witness is also competent to
testify thereto. This again is specifically excepted by the language of
the statute. Finally, if there is a living person whose interest is adverse
to that of the witness who was present when the transaction took place,
the witness is competent to testify as to the transaction. This exception
also is founded upon the wording of the statute.
The Kentucky Court has held that in order for a witness to testify
"for himself," i.e., to have such interest as would disqualify him by the
terms of the statute, he must have a direct, pecuniary interest in the
action.6 Accordingly, it must be evident
".... that he will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment, or that the record will be legal evidence for
or against him in some other action. His interest must be present,
certain and vested, and not uncertain, remote or contingent."7
Although the rule is well defined, its practical application is not
simple and may seem inconsistent on first impression in many in-
stances.
Witnesses disqualified by the statute may be divided into three
categories: first, those attempting to establish or invalidate a claim
against the estate of the decedent; second, those who are related or
affiliated with a person interested in the result of the litigation con-
cerning decedent's estate; third, those who will receive compensation
through benefit which may be derived by an interested party. Admit-
tedly this categorization is somewhat arbitrary and may in certain
5Gay v. Gay, 308 Ky. 539, 215 S.W. 2d 92 (1948).
'Arnold v. Arnold's Exr, 237 S.W. 2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
'Keny's Adm'r v. Albright, 291 Ky. 696, 698, 183 S.W. 2d 937 (1944).
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instances overlap, but it may serve as a useful guide in applying the
fundamental formula to particular situations.
I
The first class of witnesses to be considered is that group of persons
attempting to establish or invalidate a claim against the debtor's estate
-a claim which allegedly arose or gained its momentum from oral and
private transactions with the decedent or was rescinded by such a
transaction. A witness attempting to enforce such a claim may not
testify insofar as the testimony relates to those transactions.8 On the
other hand, recipients (heirs, legatees, devisees, etc.) of a portion of
the deceased's estate are not competent as to transactions with the
deceased and thus their testimony may not defeat such a claim.9 Cer-
tainly each of these witnesses has a direct pecuniary interest in the
litigation in that its legal operation will either bestow upon them or
deprive them of financial benefit. Comparable to this exclusion of
testimony of a recipient of the estate is the exclusion of testimony of a
beneficiary of a life insurance policy insofar as the testimony relates to
transactions with deceased which would tend to strengthen grounds
for recovery on the policy. 10 However, a personal representative of a
deceased person's estate is not incompetent to testify as to transactions
with deceased merely because of his position as representative. He
may testify unless he has an independent pecuniary interest in the
estate.'"
II
The second class of witnesses to be considered consists of those
related or affiliated with a person seeking to gain benefit from the
'Profitt v. Hardigan, 306 Ky. 843, 209 S.W. 2d 496 (1948); Duke's Adm'r
v. Patton, 264 Ky. 598, 95 S.W. 2d 249 (1936); Owsley v. Bowles' Adr'r, 124
Ky. 775, 99 S.W. 1157 (1907).
'Martin v. Martin, 286 Ky. 408, 150 S.W. 2d 696 (1941); McKnigbt's
Adm'x v. McKnight, 282 Ky. 522, 139 S.W. 2d 426 (1940); Lawsons Adm r v.
Brandenburg, 240 Ky. 68, 41 S.W. 2d 201 (1931); Hopkins' Adm'r v. Faeber,
86 Ky. 223, 5 S.W. 749 (1887). There is an exception to this general rule that a
recipient of a portion of the estate of a deceased person may not testify concerning
transactions with decedent, where the witness is bound by a fixed sum set out by
a will, if the amount or certainty of this sum will not be altered by the judgment
of the action in which the testimony is offered, York's Ancillary Adm'r v. Bromley,
286 Ky. 533, 151 S.W. 2d 28 (1941).
" Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Trunick's Adm'r, 246 Ky. 240, 54 S.W.
2d 917 (1932).
nWilson v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 16 F. Supp. 200 (D. C.
Ky. 1936); Combs v. Roark's Adm'r, 206 Ky. 454, 267 S.W. 210 (1924). The
trustee of the estate of a bankrupt cannot testify as to transactions with deceased
which are in the interest of the estate since the trustee stands in much the same
position as the owner of the estate, Morgan v. Moore's Ex'x, 200 Ky. 684, 255
S.W. 540 (1923).
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estate of the deceased. Recently, considerable litigation has involved
the determination of the competency of the spouse of one directly in-
terested in the outcome of the action. The court has held that the hus-
band or wife of a person who will be benefited or defeated by the
judgment is not competent as a witness as to transactions with de-
ceased because he has an interest in the spouse's estate which is not a
mere expectancy, but has already vested, and that interest brings him
within the provisions of the act.'2 Although a husband or wife of an
interested party is incompetent, a child is not,13 nor are brothers or
sisters14 or parents. 15 Although the child or parent of an interested
party may ultimately share the benefit, he has no vested interest in the
estate of his parent or child. This distinction aptly illustrates the
degree of certainty which the interest must contain. In parallel with
this distinction is the distinction between stockholders and agents or
employees of persons or corporations which are parties or are directly
interested in the outcome of the action. An agent or employee does
not have such a vested interest in the financial gain or detriment of his
principal or employer as to be disqualified from testifying.'0 Even
though he may be answerable to the principal or employer, he is not
affected by the direct legal operation of the judgment. On the other
hand, stock holders will ultimately share the pecuniary benefit or
detriment which the judgment directly imposes on the corporation. 1'7
m
The third class of witnesses involved consists of those who, al-
though not related to a party or interested person in the sense of blood
relationship or employment, will be compensated through the benefit
which a party to the suit will receive if he prevails. In order for such a
witness to come within the terms of the statute, this right to compensa-
' Johnson's Adm'r v. Johnson, 244 S.W. 2d 969 (Ky. 1951); Denney's Adm'r
Algright, 298 Ky. 696, 183 S.W. 2d 937 (1944); Truitt v. Truitt's Adm'r, 290 Ky.
632, 162 S.W. 2d 31, (1942).
"Cruse v. Dunlap, 301 Ky. 600, 192 S.W. 2d 475 (1945), Hicks v. Oak's
Adm'r, 233 Ky. 27, 24 S.W. 2d 917 (1930).
"Fields' Adm'r v. Perry Co. State Bank, 214 Ky. 24, 282 S.W. 555 (1926).5 Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'x, 237 S.W. 2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
"Sachs v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 305 Ky. 154, 202 S.W. 2d 384 (1947);
Bradley v. City of Harrodsburg, 277 Ky. 254, 126 S.W. 2d 384 (1939); Powers
v. Gatliff Coal Co., 228 Ky. 5, 14 S.W. 2d 216 (1928).
'Brown, Bell & Cowgill v. Soper, 287 Ky. 17, 152 S.W. 2d 278 (1941).
A policy holder in a mutual insurance company is not disqualified by his interest
as a policy holder in a suit against the company because his interest is remote and
inconsequential, New York Ins. Co. v. Johnson's Adn'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 72
S.W. 762 (1903). Similarly a taxpayer is not disqualified in a suit against the
Commonwealth for the same reason, Hoag's Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky.
557, 192 S.W. 2d 487 (1946).
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tion must be presently vested, legally enforceable 8 and wholly de-
pendent upon the recovery of the party. For example, an attorney
whose fee is contingent upon recovery by his client is incompetent to
testify as to transactions with a deceased person which are against the
interest of the other party to the action,' 9 whereas if he has a right to a
reasonable fee even though the other party may prevail, such testimony
is admissible20 In an action by the best friend of a minor son against
the executor of his deceased father's estate to enforce a contract
whereby the father agreed to leave his entire estate to the son, the
mother of the child was held to be competent to testify as to the trans-
actions with the deceased concerning the contract. The court held
that the parent must ordinarily provide support for a minor child if
the parent is able to do so and thus the mother of the child would not
legally benefit from the judgment since it would not relieve her of that
duty.21 An undertaker, though he may be looking to the proceeds of a
funeral benefit policy for compensation, may testify as to acts of the
decedent, as his right to compensation is not dependent upon recovery
but is absolute even in its absence.22
In conclusion, the tests to be applied in determining whether the
degree of interest of a witness is such as will render that testimony in-
competent under section 606(2) of the Civil Code of Practice are: (1)
The interest must be a pecuniary one (2) It must be present and
vested (8) It must be one which will be affected by the direct legal
operation of the judgment.
NoiuA D. Bos=n
FEDERAL TAXATION: REGULATION THROUGH TAXATION-
BOOKIE TAX
The recent enactment by Congress of the occupational tax on
persons engaged in wagering' suggests the interesting question of
whether the tax is a constitutional exercise of the taxing power con-
ferred on Congress by Art. I, sec. 8 of the Constitution. The act im-
"A witness who deceased had requested "be taken care of" out of a gift to
a party to the action was held competent to testify as to acts of deceased be-
cause the witness never had an enforceable claim against the party and it would
not become valid by legal operation of the judgment. Trevathan's Ex'r v. Dee's
Ex'rs, 221 Ky. 396, 298 S.W. 975 (1927).
" Smick's Adm'r v. Beswicek's Adm'r, 113 Ky. 439, 68 S.W. 439 (1902).
"Haydon v. Easter, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 597, 24 S.W. 626 (1894).
"Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'r, 237 S.W. 2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
'Corbin Council No. 80, Junior Order, United American Mechanics v.
Partin, 307 Ky. 827, 212 S.W. 2d 212 (1948).
' 26 U.S.C.A., 3285-3291 (1951).
